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to gain some state support, after being founded out of zeal for Christian service.
What I find particularly striking about this paean is its resemblance to a modern release by the National Association of Manufacturers extolling the economic benefits of the Free Enterprise System. Indeed, the Voluntary Principle as Baird conceives it is precisely the American system of Free Enterprise applied to the ecclesiastical sphere. Small wonder it has the same kind of triumphs to report. The triumphs are conceived in utilitarian terms. Things eminently useful to the community are being accomplished at no cost to the taxpayer, through giving scope to the zeal and ingenuity of the free citizen. It is in these terms that the Rev. Mr. Baird conceives the institutional church and its place in American life.
Half a century later, a still more exuberant statement of similar effect was written, in the introductory volume of the important American Church History Series, by H. K. Carroll, who was in charge of amassing religious data for the 189o census. After dealing with the ecclesiastical state of the country in a variety of statistical and organizational terms, Carroll provides a summary of "How the Church Affects Society" which is worth considering in full:
It is to be remembered that all the houses of worship have been built by voluntary contributions. They have been provided by private gifts, but are offered to the public for free use. The government has not given a dollar to provide them, nor does it appropriate a dollar for their support. And yet the church is the mightiest, most pervasive, most persistent, and most beneficent force in our civilization. It affects, directly or indirectly, all human activities and interests.
It is a large property-holder, and influences the market for real estate.
It is a corporation, and administers large trusts. It is a public institution, and is therefore the subject of protective legislation.
It is a capitalist, and gathers and distributes large wealth. It is an employer, and furnishes means of support to ministers, organists, singers, janitors, and others.
It is a relief organization feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, and assisting the destitute.
It is a university, training children and instructing old and young, I have tried in other places to show the historical continuity between the viewpoint of the fourteenth-century commons as expressed in this passage and the Erastianism that occupied a central position in the Anglican Church from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries. I have also tried to show the affinities between English Erastianism and comparable movements on this side of the Atlantic." What all the manifestations of this Erastian tradition have in common, and what I have taken for my purposes as a definition of Erastianism, is a view of the institutional church as one of a variety of institutions through which a Christian society conforms itself to the will of God. In practice, this view has often resulted in a domination of the church by the state, but I think that is merely a byproduct of placing the church on a par with the other institutions of society. Certainly, Erastianism is not to be equated with the totalitarian view that religious institutions are to be subordinated to secular ends. Quite the opposite, it insists that religious ends are to be pursued 'purposefully and efficiently, just as secular ends are.
It is in this venerable Erastian tradition that Baird and Carroll write, and it is an audience in the same tradition they have in mind. If anyone doubts it, let him consider what Baird and a contemporary non-Erastian such as Keble would have had to say to each other, or how Baird would have answered the English pamphleteer who attributed our Civil War to a divine punishment for our failure to have an established church.
So we can think of the dominant theme in American churchstate thinking as a kind of free-enterprise Erastianism. Adhering to the basic Erastian insight that views the institutional church as one of the many institutional forms through which a Christian society conforms itself to the will of God, it adds the American free enterprise insight that sees institutional forms as most efficient when freed from the inhibiting presence of government support. It appeals to Erastian criteria of efficiency to commend the whole system versus other systems in which government plays a more active role. SSee This Erastian conception of the American church-state nexus is by no means confined to the nineteenth century. It is nowhere more apparent than in the monumental Church and State in the United States, published by the late Canon Stokes in 1950.6 The main themes around which Stokes develops the historical and social panorama of his subject are "adjustments" and "national issues." Adjustments are the ways in which the several institutional churches, minus the benefits and burdens of state support, have fallen into their role of embodying the ecclesiastical dimension of the overall national life. National issues are those matters in which the churches have played institutional roles in dealing with the concerns of the community as a whole. The general spirit of the work is one of thoughtful analysis of the experience of a nation under God, and of the place of the institutional church in that experience.
In the long history of Christendom, the Erastian view of which these American works are the modern representatives has existed in tension with what I have called a High Church view. This view, represented by the Gregorian reformers in the twelfth century, the Laudians in the seventeenth, the Oxford movement in the nineteenth, and a variety of less prominent movements in between, has emphasized a Christian witness to the otherness of God. Hence, it has seen the institutional church as standing over against society in general, rather than as constituting one of the institutions through which society in general conforms itself to the will of God. The High Church attitude tends to point up the shortcomings of society, and to offer the Christian a way of dissociating himself from them, rather than of ameliorating them. In the past, High Churchmanship has sought an institutional witness in forms that express the independence of the church, and her freedom from the corruptions besetting the rest of society.
On the whole, though, our own country has not developed forms of this kind. Our prevailing church-state doctrine shows traces of High Church thinking, as we shall see.' But the generally optimistic tone of American society has kept such thinking from gaining a solid place in the institutional witness of any of the main-stream churches. It is well known that Roman Catholics in this country have tended to play down the transcendent institutional claims of their church and play up her place among the useful institutions of democratic society -so much so that the Roman authorities occasionally took alarm.8 It is also clear that High Anglicanism in this country, lacking the historical position of its English counterpart, did not duplicate the institutional aspirations of the earlier Tractarians." On the whole, a general denunciation of the world's ways in America has been left to fringe churches, which form enclaves and mind their own business, rather than bearing witness against the overall society.
The American legal structure has also played a part in inhibiting the growth of High Church forms. The utilitarian values characteristic of Erastianism can be implemented by a multiplicity of churches as readily as by one, by private action as readily as by the state. This is the cogent truth which American experience has shown with such finality to the other nations of the world. But the transcendent witness of High Churchmanship is hard to institutionalize in churches none of which can claim a dominant position in the overall society, or, indeed, any position at all beyond what it derives from its constituents. The Voluntary Principle is not a felicitous expression of the otherness of God.
In a period of increasing self-doubt at many levels of American not antireligious) Roger Williams' doctrine on the same subject, as set forth in the following passage, id., at 5-6: S . . The faithful labors of many witnesses of Jesus Christ, extant to the world, abundantly proving that the church of the Jews under the Old Testament in the type, and the church of the Christians under the New Testament in the antitype, were both separate from the world; and that when they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of separation between the garden of the church and the wilderness of the world, God hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed the candlestick, and made His garden a wilderness, as at this day. And that therefore if He will ever please to restore His garden and paradise again, it must of necessity be walled in peculiarly unto Himself from the world; and that all that shall be saved out of the world are to be transplanted out of the wilderness of the world, and added unto his church or garden. I will begin with a fairly extensive analysis of the legal forms in which we articulate our understanding of the nature of the institutional church and its place in our national life. Our understanding of the church itself is developed in a line of cases involving the judicial resolution of intra-church disputes and the effect to be given the mandates of ecclesiastical authority. Our understanding of the place of the church in our national life is shown in our legislative and judicial treatment of tax exemption and state support for church-connected activities.
Following this legal analysis, I will take up more briefly the Erastian forms through which the church implements the generally accepted understanding of its role in the national life, and the incipient High Church forms which may be in the process of claiming for the church a new and more radical role. In conclusion, I will offer a possible projection into the future.
II LEGAL FORMS

A. Intra-church Disputes
The status of the institutional church before the secular law presents a double aspect. On the one hand, the establishment and organizing of churches is regarded as a legitimate activity of the citizens, in which they are entitled to suitable protection from their government. On the other hand, the mediation of the church between God and man is regarded as a mystery in which the tri-bunals of the state, whether from constitutional limitations or from the nature of things, are incompetent to intervene. The two approaches are combined in varying ways in the decisions of the courts.
The first approach may be regarded as the Erastian-Voluntary approach. It sees the religious dimension of life as a part of the pursuit of happiness, and therefore as one of the functional commitments of secular government. It treats the church as one among the variety of institutions through which happiness is pursued. The second approach has affinities for the High Church position. It sees the religious dimension of life as imposing a fundamental limitation on the scope of secular government. It is capable, therefore, of looking at the church as occupying an area closed to secular government and to all those institutions secular government controls.
These two principles operate with general harmony in supporting the autonomy of American churches, but at certain points they clash. The problem when a question of ecclesiastical polity comes before the courts is whether to deal with it in terms of some principle of secular law -trust, contract, or corporation law -or in terms of the existential organic forms of the church in question. If we see the church as merely another of those arrangements developed by citizens in pursuit of their lawful occasions, we will naturally apply the principles of law by which other such arrangements are dealt with. For the purpose, we have ready to hand the substantial body of law developed in England for dealing with the affairs of dissenters from the Established Church o0 (whose organizations are secular because only the Established Church is ecclesiastical)." On the other hand, if we see the several churches, for all their diversity, as embodying in some way the institutional transcendence of Christianity, we are more apt to let their internal processes work in their own way. For this purpose, if we are unwilling to rest in the higher reaches of theology, we can find an Let us see how these alternative approaches work out in practice. In 1840, suppose, the Brimstone Evangelical Church was founded, with a Central Synod and a number of local congregations. The founders adopted a Confession of Faith and an Order of Church Polity. The former document spelled out the doctrinal tenets of the church; the latter, the organization of the local congregations and their relation to the Central Synod. The local congregation in Jordan City was founded in 1853, and operated in accordance with the Order of Church Polity. The congregation sent delegates to the Central Synod, hired ministers ordained by the Synod, and otherwise conducted itself in accordance with the regulations of the Synod. Worship was conducted on land deeded by a church member in 1856 "in trust for the Brimstone Evangelical Church in Jordan City."
A couple of years ago, the Central Synod adopted a new Confession of Faith, which mitigated considerably the uncompromising position on predestination taken by the earlier document. The new Confession was bitterly fought in the Synod, and more bitterly still in the local congregations, but the more traditionminded were in most cases outvoted. In the Jordan City congregation, a motion to reject the new confession and sever connections with the Synod was voted down 86-34.
At this point, the minority of the congregation appeals to Caesar. They are aware, of course, that the majority may adopt what doctrine they please; what they are interested in is getting the building and the bank account for their party. They claim they are entitled to these because they represent the doctrines for which the property was given. It is on this -a litigation more or less over the possession of property -that the secular courts must rule.
They have two stock legal categories to work with. The foundation documents of the church are a kind of contract, and the original deed of the land is a kind of trust. So we can look at the documents and see if they give the Synod power to change the Confession, or we can look at the intentions of the grantor and see if a change in the Confession was envisaged when he deeded the land. Either of these approaches will probably come up with a negative answer and results in giving the property to those who oppose the new Confession.
Complicate the matter a little more. Suppose that in I894 the Jordan City congregation took out articles of incorporation under one of the numerous state statutes for the incorporation of churches, providing itself with a Board of Trustees, and whatever other apparatus the statute requires. Then the courts, in addition to the appropriate questions of trust or contract, can worry about whether the vote was taken in accordance with statutory forms whether the meeting was properly called, the voting rolls properly kept, and what have you.
On the other hand, if we look at the church as a living organization, we will be reluctant to use juridical concepts so foreign to its nature to frustrate its response, to the promptings of the Spirit or the currents of the times. We may well conclude that when its institutional processes have moved as far as they are capable of moving, it is not the place of the secular authorities to stand in the way.13 To be sure, a man could set up a trust or enter into a contract to propagate a particular doctrine of predestination, but on this view of the situation we will not go out of our way to suppose that he has in fact done so. Of the two approaches described here, the more forward-looking theologians have naturally favored the second, pointing out that the first, or trust-and-contract, approach tends to inhibit religious development, especially in the area of ecumenism.'" It tends to produce a separate institutional form to correspond to every nuance of doctrine. The courts, on the other hand, when forced to concern themselves with ecclesiastical matters, have found comfort in clinging to the familiar categories of secular law.
A variety of compromises have been attempted. Some courts, for instance, especially those of New York, endeavor to draw a distinction between a "spiritual" entity, the "church," and a "temporal" entity, the "society," which exist in a kind of hypostatic union, the one governed by denominational custom, the other by state law.'" This distinction is more persuasive when applied to those Protestant bodies which restrict their communion to persons who have undergone a special experience of conversion, or who otherwise possess qualities the whole congregation does not have. 16 It seems ultimately to relate to ecclesiological conceptions that radically distinguish the Mystical Body from the visible church. Those who reject the ecclesiology in question 17 may find the judicial doctrine less than congenial. And even those who accept the ecclesiology may object to the scope the judicial doctrine gives for interfering in the temporal affairs of a church on behalf of members of the congregation who are not full-fledged communicants.
The United States Supreme Court, almost a century ago, in the famous Watson v. Jones decision,1" attempted to give some recognition to the existential organization of the church without going too far afield from familiar legal categories. Cases involving ecclesiastical property, the Court said, fell into three categories: i. Where the property is subject to an express trust, that trust will be enforced as written.
2. Where the property is held by an independent congregation, the court will apply the usual principles of law governing voluntary associations to determine which of the contending parties constitutes the congregation in question.
3. Where the property is held by a congregation belonging to a "hierarchical" church with superior judicial or administrative bodies, the determination of those bodies will be given effect. As the case involved a church in the third category, remarks about the treatment of the other two categories may be regarded as dictum. Even as to the third category, the Court's decision was only federal common-law -the state courts were not obliged to follow it."9 But as a fairly sophisticated approach to the diversity of church forms in our society, it generally commended itself. In any event, the Kedroff decision in 1952 2" erected it into a constitutional doctrine. Between Kedroff and the Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on the subject in the Hull Memorial case (January, 1969),21 the state courts developed a couple of modifications of the Supreme Court doctrine. The most important of these was the Fundamental Change Rule, whereby dissenters were protected against any change in doctrine which the courts were willing to characterize as "fundamental" even though the appropriate ecclesiastical machinery had adopted it. The theory was that the property was subject to an "implied trust" that it would not be fundamentally diverted from the religious affiliation the donors had in mind.22 This rule was applied more to congregational than to hierarchical churches, presumably because of the greater stability and expertise to be expected from the higher authorities of a hierarchical church."2 But even these higher authorities were occasionally overruled on fundamental changes.2"
The other modification was more subtle. Watson v. Jones expressly disclaimed any right of the secular courts in dealing with the affairs of a hierarchical church to determine whether the higher Be that as it may, it seems pretty clear at this point that these cases must be looked at in constitutional terms -that is, as fundamentally involving religious freedom rather than tenure of property. In applying the concept of religious freedom, there is still a double aspect. To say that a church has a constitutional right to govern itself is to give constitutional stature to entities unknown to the constitution, and perhaps establish a religion into the bargain. But to say simply that a citizen has a constitutional right to organize a self-governing church is to belie the posture of the typical litigation (in which the church itself in its corporate capacity is one of the parties), and in general to give a false picture of what we are doing. Not so, said the Court. The state may bestow its tax exemptions wherever it has a legitimate public purpose in doing so. While the promotion of religion, as such, cannot be a legitimate public purpose because of the nonestablishment clause,40 a variety of secular purposes are served by religious organizations. These the state can legitimately promote or permit the citizens to promote without paying taxes. If such purposes are so intertwined with religious activities that the latter cannot conveniently be separately taxed, the state may exempt the organization entirely. Note the Erastian tenor of the argument so far.
But there is another line of argument. Several amici curiae have urged, the Court points out, that not to grant tax exemption to a church violates the free exercise clause of the constitution. This argument has some support in Justice Douglas' 1943 opinion in Murdock v. Pennsylvania 4~ (a difficult case, which I shall take up at length below). The Court in Mrs. Murray's case was not willing to pass on this argument one way or the other, beyond saying that it was plausible enough to be taken into account by the legislature in deciding to grant the exemption. Here, of course, is a solidly High Church contention, with roots in the anathemas of Boniface VIII:
That laymen have been very hostile to clerks antiquity relates, which too the experiences of modern times manifestly declare, whilst not content with their own bounds they strive for the forbidden and loose the reins for things unlawful. Nor do they prudently consider how power over clerks or ecclesiastical persons or goods is forbidden them: So the upshot of the Murray case is that it is no establishment of religion to exempt churches from taxation, because they serve a variety of secular purposes; and it just might be an interference with free exercise to tax them, because they are religious. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.43
The Erastian interpretation of the tax exemption is borne out by a series of cases involving the exemption of atheistic organizations. Where such organizations gather for moral exhortation, hymn-singing, and the like, they are typically exempted from taxation on the ground that their activities, as one court put it, are analogous to the activities, serve the same place in the lives of [their] members, and occupy the same place in society, as the activities of the theistic churches.44
The general idea seems again to be that we are dealing with a way of pursuing happiness, that the more innocuous and high-minded of the pursuits of the citizenry ought to have this public encouragement because an innocuous and high-minded people is what we aspire to be. Another court referred to the "context of exemption to art galleries libraries, public charities hospitals schools and colleges," and inferred a "broad legislative purpose to grant support to elements in the community regarded as good for the community." 45 These cases generally suppose that the exemption accorded the atheist organization is a matter of constitutional right -that if the theistic religion were given a status denied the atheist, there would be a forbidden establishment of religion. to the fundamental Erastian insight that the church is one of a variety of institutions through which society pursues its goals. This makes the nonestablishment clause an Erastian principle. A benefit conferred on the church is free of the charge of establishment as long as the church is only one among the institutions on which the benefit is conferred.
But the notion, relied on to an indeterminate extent in Murray, that secular activities of churches form the basis of the exemption must be taken with a grain of salt. Instructive in this regard is the provision in the Internal Revenue Code for taxing "unrelated business income" of tax-exempt organizations.4" This provision, enacted in i951 to plug a substantial loophole in the existing law, imposes a tax on income made by a tax-exempt organization in a business that does not relate to the tax-exempt purpose except as a source of funds. But there is exempted from this tax the unrelated business income made by "a church, a convention or association of churches. .. ." 'YThe committee reports," a substantial article on the subject remarks, "are barren of any statement of the reason for this." " The Internal Revenue Service has defined a church, for purposes of this exemption, to be a body that performs ministerial or sacerdotal services, or conducts religious worship. The Christian Brothers, proud heirs of a long tradition of ecclesiastical winemaking, but alas, no priests, tried to get around this definition, but could not.4" As matters now stand, the Jesuits, by reason of their priesthood, enjoy the exemption, whereas the good Brothers, lacking the sacred unction, do not.
It seems unlikely (as well as unconstitutional) that Congress felt that religious worship was more deserving of encouragement than education or the relief of the poor. Rather, it seems they felt more diffident about taxing religious worship than they did about taxing equally worthy but more clearly secular works. In short, we may see in the contours of this exemption once again the mark of a High Church view. who engages in religious activities or a tax on property used or employed in connection with these activities. It is one thing to tax the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon.51
The exact nature of the distinction suggested here is a little difficult to see, and it becomes a good deal more so after it is subjected to the remorseless logic of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion.52 2. The language about "conditioning" the religious activity on the payment of a tax is somewhat reminiscent of the doctrine in the free speech cases that "prior restraints" are more objectionable than consequences visited after the event. Arguably, then, the state under Murdock can tax a man for having sold Watchtowers (by imposing a sales tax, for instance), but cannot make him pay before he sells. This argument has against it the fact that the prior restraint approach has not stood up very well in free-speech cases -most speech, if it is protected at all, is now protected after the event as well as before. At any rate, the "condition" test could be applied to most kinds of taxation. For instance, if a church building could be sold off in a tax sale, it is hard to see that paying the tax would not be a condition imposed on continuing to worship there.
3. The prevailing opinion in Murdock was very careful to put freedom of religion on the same footing with freedom of the press -as, indeed, most of the religion cases in the '40's were.53 But if the constitutional tax immunity of a church is no greater than that of a newspaper, it is not very great. In fact, though, the fol- talk about the press. Since Sherbert v. Verner 55 (1963) it would be hard to go on saying the two freedoms were the same.
Putting all these arguments together it seems to me we will have to say that the church has a constitutional right to some but not all of the tax immunity it now enjoys. I should think that a tax on investment property or investment income, a nondiscriminatory sales tax on Bibles, Watchtowers, crucifixes or rosary beads would be constitutional, whereas a tax on real estate used for religious worship or sepulture, a personal property tax on reliquaries or chalices, or an income tax on the contents of the collection plate would interfere with the free exercise of religion.5" Further, it seems that such constitutional right to exemption as the church has is not shared with other constitutionally protected activities, but belongs to the church precisely because it is the church -because it deals with a dimension of human existence that the Founding Fathers intended to shield from government intervention. However hard we try, we cannot think of a personal property tax on a typewriter as all of a piece with one on a set of Communion plate.
In the end, it seems to me, the law treats tax exemption in about the same way it treats intra-church disputes. Bradfield involved a substantial appropriation by Congress to enable a Catholic hospital in Washington to expand its facilities for the benefit of indigent patients sent by the District of Columbia Commissioners. The hospital was run by a membership corporation chartered for the purpose under secular law. It just so happened that the members of the corporation were all nuns. The Court felt that this fact made no difference:
That the influence of any particular church may be powerful over the members of a non-sectarian and secular corporation, incorporated for a certain defined purpose and with clearly stated powers, is surely not sufficient to convert such a corporation into a religious or sectarian body.63
As they were a secular corporation performing a public purpose, there was no obstacle to providing them with public funds.
Cochran involved a state providing free textbooks for schoolchildren, regardless of the kind of schools they attended. It was contended that the statute, insofar as it conferred benefits on parochial students, was unconstitutional. The Court held, however, that as everyone got the same books, and none of the books in question was religious, there could be no question of supporting religious education, or of diverting public funds to a private purpose.
To this day, those who support the spending of public funds for this or that ecclesiastical project make their case with arguments like those just set forth." Indeed, some carry the argument one step farther and insist that to exclude an activity from government support simply because it is carried out under religious 
auspices is to practice an improper, if not unconstitutional, form of discrimination:
In the event that a Federal Aid Program is enacted which excludes children in private schools these children will be the victims of discriminatory legislation. There will be no alternative but to oppose such discrimination.65
In fact, it is this very discrimination which the opponents of public support not only favor but insist is constitutionally required. For them, the fact that an otherwise innocuous activity is carried on under religious auspices creates an overriding objection to public support for it, an objection that rests on the hallowed traditions of our fathers. purpose but one the government cannot promote seems to call for this interpretation. On the other hand, the language about "the kingdom of the individual and his God," taken together with the quoting of Madison's remarks about "an unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation," seems to go deeper, to envisage a realm in which not merely the government but the secular commonwealth as such can have no place. This, of course, in its implications, is High Church.
The first, or Erastian-Voluntary, interpretation is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain in a period when so many secular aspects of the free enterprise system are receiving government support. It seems that if our basic social functions are to go on being performed at the grass-roots level by a system of local and voluntary institutions, the system will have to be supported at crucial points by a judicious input of government funds. And if free church institutions are to grow and keep pace with the rest of the system, they will have to be subsidized when the occasion arises, along with the rest. T6 cut them off from the money in this day and age is to distinguish them radically from the other institutions of society, and thus deny the Erastian presupposition on which the Voluntary Principle was based.
So, however Rutledge may have conceived himself, I think we will have to conceive him in High Church terms. If ecclesiastical projects are to be cut off from government funds, it is because they occupy a place in the lives of men where the concerns of secular government cannot follow them.
We do not seem prepared on the whole to take any of the above arguments to its logical conclusion in our national life. On the one side, there is a group called Citizens for Educational Freedom, which insists that private schools do the same job as public schools and should have the same support. But in practice, their political projects have been limited to the customary auxiliary services plus token subsidies in cash, and even with these they have had no great success. On the other side, a few civil libertarians, and even a churchman or two, have questioned the constitutionality of federal funds for church-related hospitals, or the development of urban renewal lands by church-related universities. But for the most part they have not made much of an impression. There are, it seems to me, two main principles to be discerned in our actual practice concerning state support for church-connected projects. The first is that the forms of public support which characterized the state establishments of the post-Colonial period or which fueled the Protestant-Catholic conflicts of the nineteenth century are generally to be avoided. This is why church-connected colleges fare better with the public purse than church-connected grade schools do. The principle has no logical basis; it represents simply a desire to avoid what experience has shown to be messy.
The other principle, more strictly ideological, is that the church's work of religious worship and instruction cannot, as such, be subsidized.72 This principle makes its way into the law in a number of ways -the provisions, for example, that keep anti-poverty money from being used for such purposes, or the provision that funds made available for graduate study in the humanities are not to be used for graduate theological study.73 This limitation meets with general acceptance, even from those who think religion is good for the state. When it comes to the realms of religious worship and instruction (the very realms, by the way, that we saw could probably not constitutionally be taxed), we are ready to agree with Rutledge that they are "the kingdom of the individual and his God" or at least the kingdom of the individual and his church.
There The functions we attribute to our churches in this context are not unlike those envisaged by Baird and Carroll in the last century, or, indeed, those envisaged by the English commons in i306. In the first place, we expect the church to call down the divine blessing on our public and private undertakings -much as the medieval peasant expected the priest to bless his sick cattle or pray for a bountiful harvest. So the minister, priest, or rabbi is appropriately called in for the laying of a cornerstone, or to give that peculiar combination of prayer and sermon called an "invocation" at a banquet.
Next, as our medieval forefathers expected the church "to teach them and the people the laws of God," so we expect it to provide suitable moral instruction to make good neighbors and good citizens of us all. In conjunction with this endeavor, the churches maintain a general educational enterprise parallel to that main-" Looking more or less at random for the sort of thing I have in mind, I turned to the "Church Organizations" entry in the South Bend, Indiana, telephone book on my desk. It has a quarter-page advertisement, compliments of the telephone company, saying: "Go to the Church of your choice . . . Take someone with you, you'll both be richer for it . . tained by the state and by private secular institutions. For the most part, even those who oppose government financial support for this enterprise recognize its value to the community.
Then, "to make hospitalities, alms, and other works of charity" is a function of the church today, just as it was in 1306. These works involve a rich variety of economic, social, and civic concerns, just as they did in Baird's time. Probably they are shared more today than formerly with governmental and secular organizations, but it is generally recognized that the church was first in the field, and is still entitled to an honored place.
To There is one other element in church support of civic and social activities that is generally overlooked. That is the payment of the salaries of the clergy. A good clergyman is apt to be concerned with a variety of civic projects, especially those involving race and poverty. His participation differs from that of ordinary Christian laymen in that it is generally regarded as part of his job, and yet takes nothing out of the funds available for a given project. The layman, unless he is paid, can be concerned with a civic project only in his "spare time." Obtaining unpaid personnel for secular pursuits by expanding the vocational role of the clergy is not a new expedient. Most of the governmental services of the Middle Ages were staffed by means of it. So were many of the educational services of a more recent period. Not new either is the justification offered for such an expanded clerical role: a pursuit where dedicated Christian service is appropriate is a pursuit proper to be carried on through a clerical staff. The ever-optimistic Pere Thomassin, writing in the seventeenth century, gave a justification for the clerical bureaucrat of the Middle Ages that could almost serve for the clerical NAACP leader of today: **. an opportunity to exercise their charity, to sanctify the court, to make of the kings' palace a sanctuary of piety, to purify tasks which are in themselves profane, to govern the world according to the laws of heaven, to make the truths and maxims of the Gospel prevail in the conduct of human affairs, finally, to make of Christian monarchies, with the concurrence of the monarchs, a kind of theocracy, or divine government.75
The part about kings and courts would have to be brought up to date, and there are some distinctions between the sacred and the profane that are no longer in good repute; but the part about making the truths and maxims of the Gospel prevail in the conduct of human affairs -really the crux of the matter -is as persuasive as it ever was. I do not mean to fault either the medieval or the modern cleric for his acceptance of this rationale. For one reason or another, it has never been found possible to organize the central works of the ministry -preaching, catechizing, and conducting religious worship -in such a way that all those engaged in these works can keep themselves busy doing nothing else. Accordingly, the clergy as a class have had to choose between working only parttime at their calling and accepting from the surrounding society an expanded definition of the calling itself. The latter alternative has generally seemed more in keeping with the dignity of the ministry. And if the minister's calling must be redefined to make a full-time job of it, the way we are redefining it in our society, in terms of supporting causes that otherwise lack a sufficient economic base, seems as good a way as any.
The other forms of civic involvement of the churches as I have been describing them have also a good deal to be said in their favor. If the projects in question were all conducted under governmental auspices, they would become disagreeably centralized, probably with a considerable loss of grass-roots support for them. And even if they were carried out by nonprofit secular corporations, the quality of our support for them would suffer. The participation of the churches in civic projects gives a certain religious sanction to all such projects, under whatever auspices they are conducted; it reminds us that they can be carried out from religious motives. Erastianism, in short, is a two-way street. If it carries a danger of secularizing the churches, it carries also a hope of sanctifying the world. Preachers are accustomed to speak with dogmatism the truths of religion, and they should so speak, and when they make stump speeches, they use the same dogmatism, although they are then in the field where differences of convictions exist between equally good men. There has never been in the United States a political battle in which there were not equally good men on opposite sides, but this fact, preachers turned politicians, are almost sure to forget.87
Conversely, the concern of the church with politics can be faulted for its inevitable recognition that politics is the art of the possible. Here is the judgment of the Abolitionist prophet Garrison on the judicious efforts of churchmen to ameliorate the evils of slavery:
Resolved: That (making all due allowance for exceptional cases) the American Church continues to be the bulwark of slavery, and there- Modern ecclesiastical temporizing in the areas of peace and civil rights has evoked similar condemnations from time to time. The willingness of the church thus to play the lobbyist or the politician rather than the prophet seems to me to be part and parcel of the Erastian tradition as I have been describing it -the view that the church is one of the many institutional forms through which a Christian society conforms itself to the will of God. The will of God may be in some cases unchanging and unambiguous, but if it is to be approximated in a concrete situation, means capable of affecting the concrete situation must be used. As long as the church is considered part of the institutional structure of society, it cannot be faulted either for departing from the realm of generalities or for limiting itself to practical measures.
In fact, the two-pronged critique of the church's stance on social problems rests on presuppositions that seem to me High Church. Whether we propose an even-handed proclamation of ultimate moral and religious values or an even-handed denunciation of the concrete situation, we are conceiving of the church as standing over against society in general, the guardian of a revelation to which society in general cannot be expected to conform.
IV HIGH CHURCH FORMS
The High Church view as I have been describing it provides the state with a limit and the church with a critique. What it fails to do is provide the whole church-state nexus with an institutional High Church witness. This, in my opinion, has been a serious defect in our national life. I have no wish to discount the value of our Erastian tradition in giving practical content to a number of Christian values. But the lack of High Church institutions to set that tradition off has impoverished us in a number of ways. Especially has it contributed to our tendency to an imbecile com- The trouble has come down to us out of the past. The only reason that slavery is wrong is that it is cruel and makes men cruel and leaves them cruel. Someone may say that you and I cannot repent because we did not do the act. But we are involved in it. We are still looking on. Do you not see that this whole event is merely the last parable, the most vivid, the most terrible illustration that ever was given by man or imagined by a Jewish prophet, of the relation between good and evil in this world, and of the relation of men to one another?
This whole matter has been an historic episode; but it is a part, not only of our national history, but of the personal history of each one of us. With the great disease (slavery) came the climax (the war), and after the climax gradually began the cure, and in the process of cure comes now the knowledge of what the evil was. I say that our need is new life, and that books and resolutions will not save us, but only such disposition in our hearts and souls as will enable the new life, love, force, hope, virtue, which surround us always, to enter into us. This is the discovery that each man must make for himselfthe discovery that what he really stands in need of he cannot get for himself, but must wait till God gives it to him. I have felt the impulse to come here to-day to testify to this truth."9 A judgment so formulated might bring about a massive prise de conscience in the overall society and so work an amelioration of the conditions to which the judgment was addressed. But the task of the High Church institutions is still the judgment itself. The relations between these movements and the traditional structures, which the authors call somewhat contemptuously the "institutional church," vary. Some are permissible -if unusualby traditional standards. Some are exuberantly uncanonical, heterodox, or both. Some are even excommunicated. In any event, they take their own structures (they are less unstructured than most of them suppose) more seriously than those of the traditional denominations to which they belong. The typical structure is described by one of the authors as follows:
What I have seen as the characteristic form of the Underground Church is the gathering together of Catholics, Anglicans, Protestants, and followers of Jesus (baptized or unbaptized) in a common mealbecause it is the only way they have been able to find the strength of community for the job that faced them tomorrow. Sometimes that common meal has taken the form of a traditional liturgy, or an experimental liturgy, or a completely free liturgy, or a sharing of bread and wine, or of coffee and doughnuts; I am not able to make any sharp distinctions among these even if I wished to. When it has been a liturgy, more or less, there has never been any question about the validity of any minister present; it is taken for granted that if he is authorized in his own denomination and chooses to be present, he is the representative of Christ. As a matter of course, all the ministers present concelebrate, although this is irregular for the Anglicans and illegal in Canon Law for the Romans. But we are still not at the roots of the quarrel. No serious Christian can suppose that race, poverty, and war are unimportant. These matters deserve his attention and the attention of his church. In fact, they are getting such attention. The problem is that the attention they are getting is in terms of the traditional Erastian response to social evils, as I have outlined that response above. The underground churchmen pass on this response the same condemnation Garrison passed on it a century ago:
The Church is struggling, sacrificing even its own integrity, to sustain its organic life recognized in terms of buildings, stained glass, real estate, and homiletical whoredom.99 There are those Christians who agree that racism is a moral evil but advocate prudence in removing it from society. They fear losing people as Church members; they fear losing money. If preaching the message of justice and brotherhood and the condemnation of racism means that half of our congregations are going to stop coming to church on Sunday, we will lose millions of dollars. But perhaps the Church has to die, perhaps it has to be crucified, in order to experience resurrection.100
Here, then, in the burgeoning cell groups described by these The "good news" about the freedom of the sons of God becomes perceptible and significant when its liberating message is specified as . the possibility of escape from the cycle of violence enthralling teenagers.0o7 "' BROWN, supra, note 93, at 46, seems to be working toward an understanding of this: "But if we try and enter down into the secret places of our psychology or think about our knowledge of history, we truly know that the pressures that brought us together are permanent ones." War, alienation, anonymity, gang fights: the evils are variously specified, but the sense of belonging to a small group free of the evil in question is there each time. It is one of the most powerful elements in the witness of the Underground Church.
Proclaiming God's judgment, then, on our social evils, and offering a point of refuge and freedom from them, the institutional forms of the Underground Church are authentically High Church. But they fall short of institutionalizing the fulness of the High Church witness, because they fail to stand for the transcendent sovereignty of God. It is not simply that they neglect to offer this witness; they counter it actively at two focal points. First, by claiming for the here-and-now congregation and worshipper full control over the significance of the Eucharist, they negate the transcendence of God in space and time. Second, by discounting traditional sexual values, they negate the transcendence of God in the life of the individual.
The relation of traditional Eucharistic doctrine and traditional sexual purity to the divine transcendence lies in the very fact that they are not of obvious relevance to the immediate situation. To accept them is to accept that God has something to offer to the church as a historical presence,1"0 and to me as a human being "' beyond the needs I experience here and now. essentially living by faith; it yields only gradually an insight into what they are for."2 "My thoughts are not your thoughts nor your ways my ways, says the Lord." My fear is that these Underground Church institutions, by cutting themselves off from the channels of transcendence, will deprive themselves of any insights beyond those they now possess. If so, they will fall with the passage of time, as other High Church institutions have done, from proclaiming the judgment of God into mounting a captious and irrelevant critique, from offering a position of freedom and refuge into offering an enclave of human comfort. If, on the other hand, they could in some way relate the divine transcendence to the forms in which they now operate, they might provide our society with an enduring High Church witness to set off against our Erastian tradition, and structure a truly Christian society.
V
CONCLUSION
Let me now gather these threads together, if I can, and try to outline the institutions of the American church-state nexus as it just might come to be.
First, there would be a variety of institutions conceived, as they have always been, in Erastian terms. These, some governmental, some ecclesiastical, some private and secular, would operate schools, hospitals, cooperatives, credit unions, recreational activities, and other forms of practical social service that commend themselves to Christians. Their support would come partly from specific contributions, partly from United Funds, foundations and the like, and partly from tax money, in accordance with the need and importance of each particular institution.
The participation of churches and of individual Christians in these institutions would be directed by a continuing High Church critique of the whole society. Christians would respond to the divine judgment embodied in that critique by applying their wis-dom and resources to the real needs of their society -not in the expectation of justifying themselves or the society, but in the humble expectation of redemption through Jesus Christ.
This kind of humble expectation would involve a Christian patience under the condemnations of the proponents of the High Church critique. Demonstrations, which seem to serve contemporary High Churchmen rather as excommunication served Innocent III, are neither practical proposals nor arguments. If a situation is complex, they will not make it less so; they will simply serve to make explicit the judgment of God. Those who are concerned with finding and implementing practical measures will have to take them seriously, but not panic under them.
Meanwhile, the High Church institutions would temper their strictures by a heightened awareness of the enduring realities of the human condition and the theology of redemption. Not that they would compromise their witness against the evils of society, but that they would maintain a certain respect even for those they condemned, remembering that in the last analysis the judgment they proclaim is not upon certain bad people, but upon all mankind, including themselves.
The form and development of these High Church institutions would be rather like that of the Underground Church movements I have been describing. Most of them would be spontaneous responses to particular social situations, and would come and go with the social conditions that called them forth. They would continue to offer a witness against and a liberation from the racist patterns that infect our society, the cycle of poverty in which so many of our people are involved, warfare and other forms of violence, and the dehumanizing effect of an overly efficient mass polity.
They would also offer a witness against and a liberation from the mechanistic and unlovely sexuality that permeates so much of our popular culture, and seems as dehumanizing and as displeasing to God as any of our other social evils. Perhaps they would come to this witness and liberation through a reconciliation with some of the more traditional church institutions -youth groups, Cana Conferences, and the like -that have long carried the burden of Christian witness with respect to sex. In any event, they would be free of the identification of sexual purity with white middle-class respectability that currently distorts every aspect of Christian witness in our society.
These grass-roots institutions would abandon their claim to define the meaning of the Eucharist for themselves. They would recognize that as they do not possess the fulness of the divine revelation, the meaning of the Eucharist cannot be circumscribed by their understanding of it. At the same time, the main-stream churches would accept the adoption by these groups of liturgical forms suited to their own needs, but consistent with traditional views of Eucharistic theology. This acceptance would be furthered by the realization on everyone's part that participation in groups of this kind is a special vocation rather than the wave of the future for every Christian. The reconciliation of the mendicant orders with ecclesiastical authority in the Middle Ages might be a pattern for reconciliations of this kind today.
In this context, central authorities in the church would accept the Voluntary Principle, just as do central authorities in the state. They would expect people to set up groups for particular religious purposes, just as they do for particular secular purposes. They would supervise these groups, but not expect them to obtain advance approval. 
